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Abstract: This paper is the brief history of the Bank of Taiwan (BOT, 台湾銀行) from 
1899 to 1925, especially focusing on the first to the fourth presidents who represent the 
era of the rise and fall of the BOT. The BOT was established by the Japanese 
government in 1899 as colonial development bank in Taiwan, however they changed the 
business model to that of an international bank covering mainland China and 
Southeast Asia in 1910s. This rapid expansionism failed in the early 1920s and the BOT 
temporarily closed its doors in 1927. The question is how and when these problems 
occurred and spread in the organization as a result of mismanagement. Through the 
analysis of their achievements and personal background along with corporate 
performance and macro history, we are better able to understand the rise and fall of the 
BOT.  
 




This paper elucidates the brief history of the Bank of Taiwan (BOT) from 1899 to 
1925, especially focusing on the first to the fourth presidents who represent the era of 
the rise and fall of the BOT.1 
The BOT was established by the Japanese government in 1899. As central bank and 
development bank in Taiwan, they provided not only general banking services but also 
note issue, development finance, bond underwriting and so on. On the other hand, the 
BOT described an ambitious business development plan in the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association in 1899 which said that they would expand their market territory 
to mainland China and Southeast Asia to become a financial pillar of Japanese 
economic expansionism in Asia. This plan was realized and flourished in 1910s, 
however rapid expansionism failed in the early 1920s under the serious depression after 
the First World War, and the BOT temporarily closed its door in 1927.  
Generally speaking, the reason for the collapse of the BOT was excessive lending to 
Suzuki Shoten (鈴木商店), a new and rising conglomerate in Kobe, Japan. However, this 
excessive lending is a reflection of moral hazard and lack of corporate governance in the 
long term. The question is how and when these problems occurred and spread in the 
                                                   
1 For an overview, see BOT ed. 1910, 1916, 1919, 1939; EOBOTH ed. 1964. For a detailed discussion, see Namikata 
1985; Ashihara 1986; Ito 1989; Sunaga 2005; Yokoi 2005; Hisasue 2010, 2012, 2015. 
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organization as a result of mismanagement.  
Therefore, this paper focuses on the era of 1899 to 1925, during which the first to 
fourth presidents governed the BOT. Through the analysis of their achievements and 
personal background along with corporate performance and macro history, we are better 
able to understand the rise and fall of the BOT. 
 
2. Jyuichi Soeda, the first president: 1899-1901 
(1) Establishment of the BOT 
As a result of Japanese-Sino war, the Qing dynasty ceded the Formosa islands to 
Japan in 1895. Japan started to develop Taiwan in line with its own experience of 
modernization. Financial system reform was one important policy and the Japanese 
government in Tokyo planned to establish a colonial development bank with central 
banking functions. In March 1897, the Bank of Taiwan Act was passed in the Imperial 
Diet, and the committee to establish the BOT was organized in November.  
In March 1898, Jyuichi Soeda (添田壽一), director-general of the supervisory bureau 
at the Ministry of Finance (MOF), became chairman of the committee. He 
enthusiastically led the formation of the new banking institution in collaboration with 
General Gentaro Kodama (児玉源太郎), Taiwan’s governor, and Shinpei Goto (後藤新平), 
chief of home affairs of the Taiwan Governor’s Office (TGO). In March 1899, the 
Japanese government underwrote 20% of the BOT shares for 1 million yen, and the 
committee certified the Memorandum and Articles of Association. In June 1899, the 
MOF licensed the business operation to the BOT and Soeda was appointed as president. 
The BOT officially opened its doors on July 5, 1899, in Tokyo; the Taipei headquarters 
opened on September 26, 1899.  
The first president was appointed under the rule of the Bank of Taiwan Act (Chapter 
13) and the Memorandum and Article of Association (Chapter 22), which stated that 
“the candidate for president and vice president must be a shareholder who owns more 
than 100 shares and must be appointed by the Japanese government.”2 It clearly 
suggests that the power of appointment and supervision of the BOT lies with the MOF 
in Tokyo and not with the TGO.  
 
(2) Background of Soeda 
Soeda was born in Fukuoka prefecture in 1864 and graduated from the Faculty of 
Law, the Imperial University in 1884. He joined MOF and studied abroad at the 
University of Cambridge and the University of Heidelberg for more than three years. 
After he returned from Europe, he worked for the tax bureau and the banking bureau. 
He was promoted to deputy director-general in 1890 and to director-general of the 
supervisory bureau in 1897. He was a scholarly person and studied monetary and fiscal 
                                                   
2 BOT 1910, 14, 27 
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policy, trade and foreign exchange, applied economics, and commercial history. He also 
drafted the Bank of Taiwan Act and the Industrial Bank Act. He was promoted to the 
vice-minister in 1898 but had to step down from his position a few months later because 
of the general resignation of the cabinet. Thereafter, he was appointed as president of 
the BOT.  
Soeda arrived in Taipei in August 1899. He selected executive directors who were 
able, young (in their thirties), and experienced in bureaucratic and banking fields. They  
included: Kazuyoshi Yagyu (柳生一義, vice president, former postmaster of Yokohama 
General Post Office, Ministry of Communication), Hiroshi Toki (土岐儣, senior director 
for business operations, former Korea branch general manager, First National Bank), 
Hiromi Kawasaki (川崎寛美, director for note issue and government treasury, former 
treasury bureau chief, the Bank of Japan [BOJ]), Muneyoshi Tatsuno (辰野宗義, 
director for the treasurer, former section chief, MOF), Fujitaro Shimosaka (下坂藤太郎, 
director, former section chief of the banks division, MOF).  
Under Soeda’s leadership, the BOT expanded its branch and agency networks in 
Taiwan to Taichu (台中), Houzan (鳳山), Kagi (嘉義), Shinchiku (新竹), Kobi (滬尾, a.k.a. 
Tansui 淡水), Houko Island (澎湖島), Giran (宜蘭), Tainan (台南), Kiryu (基隆) and 
Takao (打狗, a.k.a.高雄). They also opened a Kobe branch in Japan in October 1899 and 
an Amoy branch in the Fujian province of mainland China in May 1900. Regarding 
business operations, the BOT started issuing notes: 1-yen silver notes in September 
1899, 5-yen silver notes in December 1899, and 10-yen silver notes in February 1901. In 
October 1899, the BOT took over BOJ’s national treasury operation in Taiwan and 
concluded correspondence contracts with the Shanghai and Hong Kong agencies of 
Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB) to start foreign exchange and money transfer services. 
The BOT underwrote a nominal 9,000 yen of Taiwan public investment bonds issued by 
the Japanese government in June 1900 and started physical gold trading in the Takao 
agency in November of that year.  
The balance sheet figures and results were solid and the bank experienced stable 
development from 1899 to 1901. The total deposit accounts balance was 965,411 yen in 
1899; 4,974,275 yen in 1900; and 4,539,772 yen in 1901. The total lending accounts 
balance was 3,374,633 yen in 1899; 7,672,290 yen in 1900; and 6,988,439 yen in 1901. 
Bank profits were 3,549 yen in 1899; 89,793 yen in 1900; and 82,645 yen in 1901. There 
was no dividend in 1899, but the dividend rate was 6% in the first half of 1900, 7% in 
the second half of 1900, 8% in the first half of 1901, and 9% in the second half of 1901. 
Those financial numbers show that the BOT was being soundly managed. 
  
(3) Resignation of Soeda 
Despite the robust expansion of the BOT, Soeda started to consider resigning from 
the post. The reason behind this consideration was the establishment of the Industrial 
Bank of Japan (IBJ), which was based on the Industrial Bank Act drafted by him. The 
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Act failed to pass during the session of the Imperial Diet in 1899 but subsequently 
passed in 1900 and was promulgated in March 1901. Dr. Soeda became a chairman of 
the committee for establishing the IBJ and acted as de facto president. Therefore, he 
needed to select his successor at the BOT and recommended Vice President Kazuyoshi 
Yagyu. In Soeda’s opinion, Yagyu had considerable insight and a good character. 
However, some non-executive directors and board advisors opposed making Yagyu 
president because he was 36 years old at the time and did not have an in-depth career in 
the banking industry. For example, Kihachiro Okura (大倉喜八郎 ), non-executive 
director of the BOT and the owner of Okura Zaibatsu (大倉財閥) described his personal 
impressions of Yagyu in his memoir as follows: 
 
Mr. Yagyu at the time was just few years after his graduation from university. He 
was young and had less practical experience in business. I was personally 
devoted to the establishment of the BOT and sincerely wished its smooth 
business development, so I was concerned about him becoming a successor of 
Soeda.3 
 
Therefore, Soeda arranged a political maneuver with then Governor Kodama in 
Taiwan and the MOF in Tokyo supported Soeda’s succession plan. Finally, Soeda 
resigned his position in November 1901 and become the first President of IBJ in March 
1902.  
 
3. Kazuyoshi Yagyu, the second president: 1901-1916 
(1) Background of Yagyu 
Kazuyoshi Yagyu was born in Edo (a.k.a. Tokyo) in 1865. The family was famous for 
swordsmanship and his father joined the Japanese military as an officer after the Meiji 
restoration. Yagyu graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Imperial University in 
1891 and joined the MOF as an assistant officer. He later took a job in the Army 
Ministry as a civil servant and was promoted to deputy director-general in 1893. In 
1895, he was transferred to the military engineer division for infrastructure building in 
Taiwan. The head of this division was General Kodama who became the governor of 
Taiwan three years later and Yagyu enjoyed his favor. In 1897, he was assigned to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce as deputy director-general then transferred to 
the position of postmaster of Yokohama General Post Office in the Ministry of 
Communication. Obviously, he was an elite bureaucrat, however his career path was not 
as stable as was typical at the time. This was because of his impulsive character. He 
was strategic, prompt in action, and not afraid of conflict.  
In 1899, Yagyu was appointed a member of the committee for establishing the BOT. 
                                                   
3 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 270 
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This came about because of his personal relationship with Soeda. Soeda was his 
schoolmate in Osaka English Language School and Yagyu married Soeda’s adopted 
daughter in 1899. Soeda knew Yagyu’s personal character and he chose Yagyu as his 
right-hand man when he was in charge of establishing the BOT. Soeda described this in 
his memoir as follows: 
 
I told him the importance of the BOT’s mission and asked to him to work together. 
He is a man of duty and humanity, and accepted my offer immediately with his 
sprit to share our life and death.4 
 
Yagyu was appointed vice president of the BOT in April 1899, but he was not 
involved in business operations because of his lack of banking experience. However, 
once he succeeded to the position of president, he showed virile leadership as a top 
manager. Fujitaro Shimosaka, who supported Yagyu as vice president, described as 
follows: 
 
We deeply trusted Mr. Yagyu to plan for the future development or 
decision-making of daily management.5 
 
Yagyu was famous as workaholic and nicknamed “low pressure.” His ambition 
vitalized the entire organization. Vice president Kojyuro Nakagawa (中川小十郎 ) 
described him as follows: 
 
From morning to night, even on Sundays or holidays, he was always thinking 
about his duty. Once he received important telegraphs from the branches, he 
called the board of directors and discussed the matter even on nights or weekends, 
then replied with his instruction to the branch manager the next morning. His 
working style was too extreme and caused pressure for subordinates but nobody 
could complain about it. Finally everyone followed him together. Under his strong 
leadership, entire the staff learned his style and the BOT has grown more and 
more prosperous.6 
 
Yagyu himself is not only a man of strong leadership but also of self-discipline. 
Shinpei Goto introduced his character as follows:  
 
He was very cautious and stable man. He was very strict about money and was 
                                                   
4 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 317 
5 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 490 
6 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 328 
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proof against corruption.7 
 
His subordinate Jyokichi Ikeda (池田常吉) described him as follows: 
 
He grasped and understood the small figures about business operations. He 
spared no investment for business expansion but strictly economized managerial 
expenses.8 
 
Because of his family background, he was a person who strictly kept the traditional 
code of the Japanese swordsmanship which stressed courage, loyalty, self-discipline, 
simple living, and honor. He was nicknamed “Lord Yagyu” and was respected by 
subordinates. Yagyu was always aware of public duty and national interest, and it was 
because of his strong motivating power that the BOT developed its business to be more 
than just a colonial bank in Taiwan. Vice President Shimosaka described him in his 
memoir as follows: 
 
He always said that he would not have accepted any position if the BOT was just 
an ordinal commercial bank. He said, “I am here because I am contributing to my 
country.”9 
 
His leadership defined the development of the BOT from a colonial bank in 1900s to 
an international bank in 1910s.  
 
(2) Development as a colonial bank in Taiwan 
The BOT continued its steady growth. In 1904, they started to issue yen gold notes 
to adjust Taiwan’s currency standard from the silver to the gold standard as mainland 
Japan had done, then stopped issuing yen silver notes in 1909. The BOT promoted 
investment in Taiwan and financed specific sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, 
export trade, and so on. The branch and agency networks gradually and strategically 
expanded outside of Taiwan to places such as Hong Kong (1903), Foochow (1905), Osaka 
(1906), and Swatou (1907).  
The balance sheet results showed sound development in the period from 1901 to 
1907. The total deposit accounts balance was 4,539,772 yen in 1901; 6,470,528 yen in 
1902; 5,563,599 yen in 1903; 6,017,744 yen in 1904; 6,835,875 yen in 1905; 10,171,130 
yen in 1906; and 11,862,070 yen in 1907. The total lending accounts balance was 
6,988,439 yen in 1901; 9,987,909 yen in 1902; 9,392,622 yen in 1903; 10,274,627 yen in 
1904; 10,655,558 yen in 1905; 14,464,390 yen in 1906; and 18,266,106 yen in 1907. The 
                                                   
7 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 414 
8 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 241 
9 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 491 
9 
 
balance of notes issued was 2,943,750 yen in 1901; 3,977,349 yen in 1902; 4,161,162 yen 
in 1903; 5,901,245 yen in 1904; 7,814,974 in 1905; 9,888,020 in 1906; and 10,638,502 
yen in 1907. Bank profits were 82,645 yen in 1901; 162,589 yen in 1902; 153,714 yen in 
1903; 178,301 yen in 1904; 215,546 yen in 1905; 247,503 yen in 1906; and 380,255 yen 
in 1907. The dividend rate was 9% from the second half of 1901 to 1904, and 10% in the 
first half of 1905.  
The stable balance sheet and results a reflection of macro-economic growth in 
Taiwan. Taiwan succeeded to realize fiscal balance in 1905 and a favorable trade 
balance in 1907. Therefore, the BOT carried its business development into further 
stages. Originally, the Memorandum and Articles of Association clearly described the 
mission that the BOT is not only the central and development bank in Taiwan but also 
is an international bank servicing South China and Southeast Asia as a financial pillar 
of Japanese economic expansionism. 
However, Yagyu was a man who favored prudent and thorough preparation. He 
ordered detailed research about potential businesses and markets in Asia. This project 
covered micro- and macroeconomics, socio-economic/political considerations, and a wide 
geographical distribution. The research began around 1907 and the research division 
was officially established in 1912; they subsequently published more than 350 reports. 
On the other hand, the BOT subsidized research activities by outsiders to collect 
information about Asia. Yagyu himself went to Europe on a tour of inspection from April 
1908 to February 1909 to extend his knowledge and ideas for business expansion.  
 
(3) Paradigm shift 
In 1910s the BOT started expanding to overseas markets. In April 1910, the BOT 
increased its note-issuing limit to 10,000,000 yen and its capital to 10,000,000 yen to 
ensure sufficient reserves and capital. At the same time, the BOT had a plan to 
introduce foreign investors as strategic shareholders, however this plan was opposed by 
the MOF and was not realized. In the first half of 1910s, the branch and agency 
networks were obviously expanded to locations outside of Taiwan such as Canton and 
Tokyo (1910), Shanghai (1911), Singapore and Jiujiang (1913), London (1914), and 
Hankow and Surabaya (1915). Geographically, the network extended from 
mainland China to Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the Tokyo branch was the 
second headquarters of the BOT and the London branch was a connecting point 
to the global financial system.  
In mainland China, the BOT had committed business operations such as trade 
settlement, issuing of promissory notes, syndicate loans, and so on. Yagyu was 
personally interested in China market and released his conceptual plan for Meiji Bank 
(明治銀行 ) for Manchurian economic development in 1907. He also planned and 
attempted to implement currency reform in China in 1911, which was based on the 
circulation of silver yen coins and yen promissory notes. On the other hand, he 
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encouraged the establishment of Chunichi Jitsugyo (中日実業) in 1913 as an investment 
vehicle to China. Yagyu also released another conceptual plan for Nisshi Bank (日支銀
行) in January 1915 as a joint venture banking institution using Chinese capital. It was 
realized as “Chunichi Bank” (中日銀行, opened in Henan province in 1917) and “Chuka 
Waigyo Bank” (中華匯業銀行, opened in Beijing in 1918). However, the circulation of 
silver yen coins had been decreasing after its peak in 1918. Some part of the syndicate 
loans turned non-performing, and joint ventures were also forced to restructure or 
liquidate in the late 1910s. 
Another major target for outer expansion was the area between Southern China and 
Southeast Asia, which was connected to overseas Chinese business networks. In these 
areas, major European banks provided financial services to local merchants. The BOT 
tried adopt their business model and take over their market share. Yagyu noted his 
ambition of southward strategy as follows: 
  
If it is impossible for the BOT to expand its business operations in the South 
because we have “Taiwan” in our name, we should not hesitate to remove or 
change it. Under the current situation and given our duty, there is no room to 
grow if we are stuck on this island with nothing to do about it.10 
 
The turning point was outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Many European 
banks were involved in economic turmoil, which undermined the smooth conduct of 
business operations. This was a golden opportunity for the BOT and they significantly 
expanded their business in the South. Yagyu imagined was a tripod structure based on 
the areas of Taiwan, overseas, and mainland Japan. Within this structure, Taiwan was 
a linkage point of the greater Japanese economic area from Northeast to Southeast Asia. 
He enthusiastically believed this was the manifest destiny of the BOT. It was also 
linked with the popularity of “Southward Movement” in Japan, which sought economic 
opportunity in the South as reflection of outer expansionism.  
Under these political and economic trends, the BOT started various kinds of new 
businesses. For example, the BOT and overseas Chinese merchants in Dutch East India 
discussed setting up a joint venture banking business with the aim of collaborating with 
overseas Chinese business networks to cultivate local business in Asia. In 1914, they 
also started loan and money order operations for Japanese rubber planters on the 
Malay Peninsula. In mainland Japan, they started promoting trade bill settlement and 
foreign exchange operations, targeting small and medium-size Japanese trading houses 
and manufacturers. In May 1915, the BOT increased their capital to 20,000,000 yen to 
support massive and rapid business expansion.  
As a reflection of above trend, the balance sheet and results also showed expansion 
                                                   
10 Hekiyokai ed. 1918, 304 
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in the period from 1908 to 1915. The total deposit accounts balance was 11,188,747 yen 
in 1908; 17,436,923 yen in 1909; 18,860,969 yen in 1910; 23,869,329 yen in 1911; 
34,029,398 yen in 1912; 43,286,968 yen in 1913; 54,187,098 yen in 1914; and 74,580,179 
yen in 1915. It increased more than 6.6 times in 7 years. The total lending accounts 
balance also increased nearly 5.9 times; it was 19,563,829 yen in 1908; 26,204,174 yen 
in 1909; 27,965,832 yen in 1910; 35,586,617 yen in 1911; 45,157,240 yen in 1912; 
57,054,418 yen in 1913; 62,002,295 yen in 1914; and 115,129,767 yen in 1915. The 
balance of notes issued was 9,704,212 yen in 1908; 13,007,234 yen in 1909; 16,049,411 
yen in 1910; 19,381,989 yen in 1911. It recorded its peak of 20,414,850 yen in 1912, then 
it hovered around 18,785,608 yen in 1913; 14,247,876 yen in 1914; and 17,611,315 yen 
in 1915. Bank profits were 484,177 yen in 1908; 498,677 yen in 1909; 516,149 yen in 
1910; 513,318 yen in 1911; 514,140 yen in 1912; 589,074 yen in 1913; 652,182 yen in 
1914; and 861,819 yen in 1915. The dividend rate was 10% as before from 1908 to 1915.  
 
(4) Behind the expansionism  
However, massive expansion of the BOT caused a chain reaction of mismanagement 
and it became the remote cause of failure in the late 1920s. One of the factors is a 
loosening of financial and management control. Obviously, rapid expansion of business 
operations exceeded the management resources or ability of the organization in the 
middle of 1910s. For example, a letter from Yagyu to a director in October 9, 1914 
suggests that the BOT fundraising could not catch up with its enormous capital demand 
for business expansion: 
 
The financial condition of the BOT is not smooth right now. It is difficult to get 
more accommodation from the BOJ. However it is impossible to abandon our 
business plans and we should do the best with all our might.11 
 
Another factor is a change in the relationship with political powers. Yagyu strictly 
kept distant from political powers and tried to minimize their influence on the BOT. 
However such organizational culture gradually changed and gave rise to a corrupted 
relationship with politicians or politically backed businessmen. This influenced the 
bank’s management and caused moral hazard in the organization. On the other hand, 
there were a lot of conflicts of opinion between the BOT and the MOF at the time 
because of its rapid expansion to overseas markets. The MOF had intended to reduce 
the influence of the TGO which encouraged and supported Yagyu and the BOT’s 
overseas expansion in line with their Southward policy. Therefore, Yagyu made 
strenuous efforts to maintain a balance between both authorities.12 
                                                   
11 Shimuzu & Ono ed. 1922, 237 
12 “Yagyu was totally isolated in Taiwan. This was because of not only his overweening pride but also the influence 
of central political powers.” (Sugiyama 1929, 304) 
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In late 1915, Yagyu suddenly considered resigning as president after he met Soeda in 
Tokyo in August. Obviously, it was because of political pressure from the MOF, which 
tried to control the BOT. The MOF had to select the next president but dismissed the 
promotion of vice president Nakagawa, who was backed by Duke Kinmochi Saionji (西園
寺公望), a court noble and powerful political figure. Therefore, the MOF appointed their 
assistant vice minister Tetsutaro Sakurai (櫻井鐵太郎) as the new president of the BOT.  
In January 1916, Yagyu officially resigned his position and left the BOT. In April 
1917, he was appointed director of Nippon Yusen (日本郵船), the biggest shipping 
company in Japan. He also accepted the position of senior advisor of the China and 
Southern Bank (CSB, a.k.a. Kanan Ginko, 華南銀行 ) and establishing committee 
member of Taiwan Electric (台湾電力) in 1919. However, he passed away from a chronic 
disease in January 1920 at the age of 56. 
 
4. Tetsutaro Sakurai, the third president: 1916-1920 
(1) Background of Sakurai 
Sakurai assumed office as president in January 1916. He was born in Shizuoka 
prefecture in 1865 and graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Imperial University in 
1890. He joined the Board of Audit and transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs. He 
was appointed deputy director-general of Nagano and Fukuoka prefectures, chief of 
police of Okayama prefectural police, and secretary of Ibaragi prefecture. He was 
transferred to the MOF and was appointed chief of the tax inspection department of the 
Tokyo tax bureau, chief customs inspector of Kobe customs, director-general of the tax 
bureau, customs bureau and monopoly bureau, and then promoted to assistant vice 
minister. 
He had an even temperament but was indecisive and lacking in self-assertion. 
Known as a capable official but not from the main current of the MOF, he could not be 
promoted further. However, from the view point of the MOF, his appointment as 
president of the BOT was appropriate. At the time, the top management of the BOT was 
in a delicate situation between the MOF, the TGO and the part of board of directors who 
were backed by specific political or interest groups. Therefore, the MOF had to send a 
man who would follow their intention exactly while not to causing any trouble with 
others.  
When Sakurai was appointed, the tide was still running in favor of the BOT. The 
economy was unprecedentedly prosperous due to special procurement demands for the 
world war. The branch and agency networks continued to expand to Semarang, 
Yokohama, New York and Bombay in 1917, Batavia, Touen (桃園) and Nantou (南投) in 
1918, and Moji and Bangkok in 1919. In business operations, the mainland Japan 
branches started to promote “trust deposits” in November 1916. It was the first unit 
trust product in Japan, which became popular with retail customers. In December 1917, 
the BOT applied to increase its limited security reserve up to 20,000,000 yen, which was 
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approved in April 1918. In 1919, the CSB was established as a joint venture with 
overseas Chinese merchants in Asia. It was an important subsidiary bank which aimed 
to cultivate local customers and business in the markets around South China and 
Southeast Asia. To support business expansion, the BOT increased its capital to 
30,000,000 yen in April 1918 and to 60,000,000 yen in September 1919. Sakurai made a 
speech at an extraordinary shareholders meeting in 1919 as follows: 
 
We had a plan to increase our capital during wartime. However, aware of the 
back reaction of economy, we suspended this plan and had been waiting for 
another opportunity. Today, we need more capital to facilitate the expansion of 
our business operations and investments, which is supported by the booming 
domestic/overseas economic trends after the war. Therefore, we decided to 
increase our capital up to 60,000,000 yen.13 
  
However, the above speech suggests that the BOT lost their cautiousness and proper 
vision as a banker in the euphoria of a bubbling economy.  
 
(2) Decline in financial position 
The results of the BOT had still had been growing superficially in the period from 
1916 to 1919. Bank profits increased to 906,223 yen in 1916; 1,351,637 yen in 1917; 
1,873,968 yen in 1918; and 2,718,236 yen in 1919. The dividend rate stayed at 10% as 
before. However, the balance sheet indicates a decline in financial position. The total 
deposit accounts balance was 116,106,820 yen in 1916 and recorded its peak of 
428,073,128 yen in 1918 before decreasing to 319,671,306 yen in 1919. The total lending 
accounts balance also recorded a double increase from 172,609,428 yen in 1916 to 
357,955,726 yen in 1917, then reached 457,271,450 yen in 1918 and 524,964,455 yen in 
1919. However, this was a reflection of bad loans made in mainland Japan in the late 
1910s that would turn into non-performing loans later. A more remarkable point is the 
debt and loan accounts. The total debt accounts balance was only 150,000 yen in 1916, 
zero in 1917 and 1918 but then suddenly recorded 44,700,000 yen in 1919. The BOT also 
took huge amount of call loans totaling 60,220,000 yen in 1919 compared with zero 
before. Obviously, this suggested the shortage of funds in its financial position.  
In the same period, there were some rumors that the BOT was hiding bad loans in 
their subsidiaries such as the CSB. Sankuro Ogasawara (小笠原三九郎), managing 
director of the CSB recounted the following story in his memoir: 
  
I frequently got bad rumors from Taiwan. It was that we shoulder bad loans from 
the BOT. At the time, the BOT was affected by the increase in non-performing 
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14 
 
loans due to the depression, and some insiders reported this to the MOF. 
Management expected that the MOF would inspect account books sooner or later. 
They were embarrassed and tried to hide non-performing loans with us to dodge 
their responsibility.14 
 
However, the economic perspective of Sakurai and the BOT was still optimistic. In 
January 1920, Sakurai mentioned a possible economic downturn but remained bullish 
as reflected in the following statement: 
 
Some people warning about serious depression after the war, however I believe it 
is not necessary to worry about it too much. We can avoid the negative effects of 
depression if we closely watch the situation and keep sound management. This 
year is the time for caution but also for enjoying the harvest of prosperity.15 
 
Soon the crash came in March 1920. Stock markets in Tokyo and Osaka plunged and 
triggered a serious depression. The BOT’s business operations and financial position 
deteriorated drastically. Sakurai was quick to seize an opportunity. He abandoned his 
position in August and became the Mayer of Kobe in October 1920.  
 
5. Kojyuro Nakagawa, the fourth president: 1920-1925 
(1) Background of Nakagawa 
Kojyuro Nakagawa was born in Kyoto in 1866 and graduated from the Faculty of 
Law at the Imperial University in 1893. His family were attendants of Duke Kinmochi 
Saionji, a court noble and powerful politician. Because of this family background, he 
served for Duke Saionji as secretary to the Minister of Education then resigned his 
position in 1898 following Duke Saionji’s resignation as Minister. In 1900, he 
established Kyoto Housei Gakkou (京都法政学校, Kyoto School of Law and Politics, later 
called Ritsumeikan University, 立命館大学). In 1906, he served Duke Saionji again as 
secretary to the cabinet and prime minister of the first Saionji cabinet. After a general 
resignation of the Cabinet in 1908, he was transferred to Karafuto Prefecture 
(Karafuto-cho, 樺太庁) in South Sakhalin.16 In September 1912, he was appointed as 
vice president of the BOT when the bank began its external expansion outside of 
Taiwan.  
The reason of his transfer to the BOT was not only his political background; he was 
also an enthusiastic “Southward Movement” activist as the chancellor of Kyoto Housei 
Gakkou. He stated his opinion about the role of the BOT as follows: 
 
                                                   
14 Ogasawara 1964, 169-170 
15 Jiji Shinpo 1920, January 6 
16 Karafuto Prefecture was a hotbed of corruption and one of sources of political funds for Duke Saionji and his 
political party “Rikken Seiyukai” (立憲政友会, Constitutional Association of Political Friendship).  
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We should remember the function of Taiwan, which is not the far part of the 
Empire but a stepping stone of our economic expansion to South China and 
Southeast Asia. We need to reconsider the role of financial institutions in Taiwan 
from a more advanced level.17 
 
Nakagawa also believed that the BOT should expand its merchant banking business 
to support Japan’s overseas activities in Southeast Asia. Therefore, he strongly 
encouraged Japanese entrepreneurs overseas after he joined the BOT. One example of 
this is the venture business by Hiroichiro Ishihara (石原廣一郎) who was a student of 
Kyoto Housei Gakkou and became a business tycoon in Southeast Asia in 1930s. In 
1919, Ishihara planned an iron ore mining business in Johor, British Malay. He 
approached Nakagawa and heard back from him; Nakagawa sent a senior banker to 
Johor to inspect the site and introduced Taiwanese investors to Ishihara. In February 
1920, the BOT loaned a total of 350,000 yen to Ishihara and his plan was successful.  
However, Nakagawa was not a professional banker. His relationship with 
entrepreneurs or speculators who had a strong need for capital was inappropriate 
because personal considerations could cause a loosening of management discipline or an 
increase in moral hazard. Business gossip at the time reported many troubles the 
following illustrates: 
 
Nakagawa criticized former president Sakurai regarding the non-performing 
loans to Suzuki Shoten, but he loaned out a few more tens of million yen 
immediately after he took over his position as president. Some rumors said that, 
because of his personal relationship with the troubled Kuhara business group, he 
overpowered his opponents in management and loaned out a few more tens of 
million yen, which was highly likely to turn uncollectible debt. He also strictly 
ordered the general manager of Osaka branch to loan the bank’s money to 
Jinsuke Hiraabayashi, a famous speculator and businessman with political 
contacts. But he fired the general manager once the loan became irrecoverable.18 
 
He had a big vision for national interests however did not have knowledge of finance, 
economics or actual management. Such a man was not capable of dealing with the 
difficult situation of the depression in the early 1920s. Business gossip criticized 
Nakagawa as follows: 
 
He lacks experience or skill as a professional banker but is well experienced as a 
politician. He totally controlled the BOT as his own after former president 
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18 Asahi Shinbun Economic Reporter ed. 1924, 190-191 
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Sakurai left his office. Other senior management can’t oppose against him.19 
 
(2) Deteriorating financial position 
The influence of depression and the mismanagement with moral hazard led by 
Nakagawa, resulted in a drastic deterioration in the period from 1920 to 1925. 
The BOT posted its record profit of 3,100,325 yen in 1920. This was followed by a 
downward trend in profits: 3,091,877 yen in 1921; 2,340,858 yen in 1922; 2,357,708 in 
1923; 2,359,723 yen in 1924; and 1,371,440 yen in 1925. In particular, the BOT posted a 
huge loss of 26,493,197 yen in the first half of 1925. However, the loss was covered by a 
reduction of paid-up capital from 52,500,000 yen to 39,375,000 yen and a reversal of 
funds in reserve from 14,180,000 yen to 1,840,000 yen in the second half of 1925. The 
dividend rate was 10% until the first half of 1922 but was reduced to 7% starting in the 
second half of 1922; dividends were suspended altogether in the first half of 1925.  
The balance sheets also reflected the difficulties of the financial position. The total 
deposit accounts balance was 191,127,496 yen in 1920; 160,720,442 yen in 1921; 
170,500,634 yen in 1922; 201,905,109 yen in 1923; 224,984,346 yen in 1924; and 
134,380,341 yen in 1925. On the other hand, the total lending accounts balance was 
455,939,149 yen in 1920; 498,508,748 yen in 1921; 552,645,209 yen in 1922; 630,608,627 
yen in 1923; 716,453,684 in 1924; and 669,358,762 yen in 1925. Obviously, the 
loan-deposit ratio reflects extreme over-lending.  
This deterioration was caused by a rapid increase in bill discount operations, which 
recorded 227,337,996 yen in 1920; 224,050,435 yen in 1921; 266,517,049 yen in 1922; 
312,006,429 yen in 1923; 375,369,966 in 1924; and 408,055,514 yen in 1925. The 
amount was pushed up by a “moratorium bill” issued by troubled borrowers of the BOT 
after the Great Kanto earthquake in 1923. On the other hand, ordinal loans comprised a 
relatively small amount of total lending but increased from 58,197,617 yen in 1920; 
60,838,650 yen in 1921; 61,443,813 yen in 1922; 64,015,676 yen in 1923; 72,657,990 yen 
in 1924; to 77,881,989 yen in 1925.  
The only way that the BOT could cover its shortage of funds was borrowing. The 
total debt accounts balance drastically increased. It was 165,915,893 yen in 1920; 
216,003,414 yen in 1921; 233,205,296 yen in 1922; 300,285,344 yen in 1923; 371,723,637 
yen in 1924; and 460,486,148 yen in 1925. The Jiji Shinpo newspaper described the 
critical financial position of the BOT in May 1922 as follows: 
 
As a colonial bank in Taiwan, South China and Southeast Asia, the BOT is not 
only supporting overseas Japanese business activities in the area but also has a 
duty to providing financial services as an exchange bank. However, they only 
have special privilege of note issuing rights for 30,000,000 yen and are now facing 
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a serious funds shortage. Their financial position strained by serious 
irregularities, such as the need to take tens of millions in coal loans to cover their 
fixed lending.20 
 
(3) Restructuring of the business model 
The MOF and the BOJ tried to save the BOT and closely monitored the situation. In 
November 1920, the BOJ supplied a total of 20,000,000 yen in extra funds to the BOT to 
ease its tight financial position. In June 1921, the MOF sent a special inspection team 
to Taipei to review the situation. Nakagawa and the top management team started to 
restructure the business model and set up a special task force team in the Tokyo branch. 
In April 1922, the BOT announced it was changing its business model as follows; (a) 
concentrate on exchange banking business, (b) collect the loans in mainland Japan 
branches as soon as possible, and (c) spin off the mortgage business in Taiwan and the 
development finance business in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the BOT asked the 
MOF and the BOJ for special favors such as low interest special financing from the BOJ 
to support foreign exchange operations and permission for bond-issuing rights to 
support overseas Japanese business. The MOF required the consolidation of 
non-performing loans, cost cutting and dividend reductions. The BOT accepted these 
requirements.  
However, the BOJ had another intention for high-level political struggle behind this 
aid. The BOJ required to the BOT to accept a new vice president candidate, Hirozo Mori 
(森廣蔵), ex-director of YSB and loyal subordinate of Junnosuke Inoue (井上準之助), 
governor of the BOJ and a political enemy of Duke Saionji and his political party. 
Governor Inoue tried to limit the influence of Nakagawa not only in actual management 
but also through a hidden political agenda to cut or reduce the flow of political funds 
from the BOT to Duke Saionji via business cronies.21 
In March 1923, the BOT organized a secret meeting with the MOF, the BOJ, 
influential business figures, advisors, and major shareholders to discuss the 
restructuring plan. Subsequently, the special resolution passed at a general 
shareholders meeting in April and the BOJ agreed to provide a total of 60,000,000 yen 
to the BOT. 
 
 (4) Point of no return 
The BOT tried to change its business model from a general banking institution to an 
exchange banking institution. However, in June 1923, the exchange business in China 
and Southeast Asia received a blow from the boycott of Japanese goods. In September 
1923, the Great Kanto earthquake hit the Japanese economy, which caused an increase 
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21 “Mori and his subordinates tried to cultivate the resource of political funds for their boss, Junnosuke Inoue who 
had a strong ambition to political arena.” (Ogasawara 1964, 308) 
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in uncollectable loans.  
For example, Kuhara Shoji (久原商事) which was led by Fusanosuke Kuhara (久原房
之助), an adventurous entrepreneur, was a major borrower that business operation 
suspended in November 1923. Kuhara had a strong political connection with Kenjiro 
Den (田健治郎), the governor of Taiwan from 1919 to 1922. Governor Den supported 
Kuhara’s natural resource development plan in Southeast Asia and the BOT supplied 
the loans. The remaining debt balance was nearly 21,000,000 yen at the time and the 
BOT could only collect 8,000,000 yen from Kuhara Shoji.22  
A more serious example was that of Suzuki Shoten, which was a major reason for the 
collapse of the BOT. Suzuki had monopolized the camphor oil business in Taiwan since 
the late 1890s because they had a strong connection with Shinpei Goto, the ex-chief of 
home affairs of TGO who became a powerful politician later.23 Suzuki’s remaining debt 
balance was nearly 80,000,000 yen in March 1920. However Suzuki had massively 
diversified its business worldwide in 1910s and it was seriously damaged by the 
depression in the early 1920s. In May 1922, the BOT tried to rescue Suzuki and 
arranged additional financing by bill discount up to 50,000,000 yen under the special 
permission of the MOF and the BOJ. However, Suzuki over-issued promissory bills that 
made bad use of the moratorium after the Great Kanto earthquake. The BOT created a 
special task force team, which was in charge of Suzuki matter. Sankuro Ogasawara, 
who was the chief of task force team at the time, described the situation as follows: 
 
It was a highly confidential matter about Suzuki. Because once the net position of 
the lending to Suzuki leaked, it may cause financial disturbance both inside and 
outside of the BOT, and might cause a run on the bank. So I strictly controlled 
any information and kept all related confidential documents in a safe box beside 
my desk. One day, at the general manager meeting, someone asked a question 
about lending to Suzuki, but president and directors looked at each other and did 
not answer anything.24 
 
The above passage shows that BOT’s corporate governance did not work properly in 
the catastrophic situation, and the BOT had already crossed the point of no return. 
In March and September 1924, the BOT presented restructuring plans to the MOF 
and the BOJ again. However, Kihachiro Okura, who was a big business figure and a 
senior advisor of the BOT since 1899, suddenly resigned his position as auditor. On the 
other hand, the BOT could not stop additional loans to Suzuki. The remaining debt 
balance for Suzuki was recorded at more than 280,000,000 yen at the end of 1924. 
Under this catastrophic situation, the BOT’s top management decided to call Nakagawa 
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In August 1925, the BOT announced that Nakagawa’s term of office had expired and 
that he retired his position as president. After this “retirement,” he was elected as a 
member of the House of Peers by imperial nomination in December 1925. After that, he 
took an active part in the political arena as a close advisor of Duke Saionji. At the same 
time, vice president Mori was promoted to president and he tried to rescue the BOT. In 
September 1925, another restructuring plan passed the general shareholders meeting, 
however the MOF and the BOJ had already abandoned this “sinking ship.” Only 
politicians, rogue businessman and speculators were involved in the BOT. The 
reputation the BOT used to have—as representing the high ideal of national interest 
and as a financial pillar for Japanese overseas expansion—was gone. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This brief history of the BOT from 1899 to 1925 does not overturn the established 
story. However, by focusing on the side stories about presidents as top management, we 
can better understand the background of the story.  
Jyuichi Soeda, the first president, was not only an able official and theoretician but 
also an excellent negotiator and mediator. As a top manager of the newly established 
bank for the development of Taiwan, he was required to perform multiple tasks for the 
smooth establishment and operation of the organization. He completed his mission 
within two years and the framework he established provided the ground for the BOT’s 
subsequent development. 
Kazuyoshi Yagyu, the second president, inherited Soeda’s solid legacy and 
consolidated the basis of the BOT. Personally, his character was strict and cautious. 
Therefore he took a conservative approach to overseas business expansion even though 
he had great vision and a passion for it. However, he was not a professional banker. 
Under the booming economy during the First World War, he was obsessed with the 
massive and rapid expansion of business operations far beyond the organization’s 
capacity. This stimulated and revitalized the organization, however the BOT gradually 
lost this conservative attitude as banking institution. 
Tetsutaro Sakurai, the third president, was a typical bureaucrat with a lack of 
practical banking or management experience. He was a nominal head and could not 
manage the BOT under the trend of expansionism in the booming economy. This would 
lead the BOT to the catastrophic situation of the 1920s.  
Kojyuro Nakagawa, the fourth president, had a strong political background and this 
made situation more complicated. He also had high ideals of the “Southward Movement” 
and was an enthusiastic promoter of it. However, he lacked ability as a professional 
banker and much more as a politician. Therefore, the BOT was infiltrated by political 
powers and speculative businessmen. Under the deteriorating situation in the early 
1920s, Nakagawa could not take decisive action and abandoned the BOT for the 
20 
 
political arena with a golden parachute. 
The four presidents had bureaucratic backgrounds and were not professional 
bankers because the BOT was a semi-governmental financial institution with a public 
mission. However, the necessary attitudes of bankers and bank leadership are different 
from those of bureaucrats and other business sectors. A banking institution is a pillar of 
economic system and its management should be solid as a rock. Therefore, bankers 
require self-discipline and a conservative attitude. They must respect the 
organizational structure and process and lead the organization with a consensus from 
all interest groups. With the exception of Soeda, these presidents were not suitable for 
top management of a banking institution. In other words, the BOT failed to cultivate a 
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